

Procedural and Legal Motivations to Correct for Perceived Judicial Biases

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Received December 1, 1997; revised August 15, 1998; accepted September 24, 1998

The question of whether procedural or legal concerns per se can motivate corrections of jurors' judgments when in conflict with accuracy concerns was examined. Mock jury members were exposed to diagnostic incriminating evidence that was obtained in either serious or mild violation of due process and that was ruled as admissible or inadmissible. When the evidence was obtained in serious violation of due process, jurors corrected for it whether or not it was ruled as inadmissible, consistent with a personal concern with procedural justice. When the evidence was obtained in mild violation of due process, jurors corrected for the evidence when it was inadmissible but not when it was admissible,

This research was supported in part by a National Science Foundation grant (SBR 9520854) to Richard E. Petty, a National Institutes of Mental Health predoctoral fellowship (T32-MH19728-03) to Monique A. Fleming, and a National Institutes of Health grant (P01-MH/DA56826) to Duane T. Wegener. We appreciate the thoughtful comments on this research by members of the 1995–1998 Groups for Attitudes and Persuasion at Ohio State. In addition, we thank David Lamb for assistance in developing the case materials and Leandre Fabrigar for statistical advice. Portions of this research were presented at the 1998 meeting of the Midwestern Psychological Association in Chicago.

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consistent with a legal motivation. We suggest that corrections made in a social role (i.e., juror) can be motivated by both procedural and legal concerns, even when they conflict with perceived accuracy. © 1999 Academic Press

Social perceivers often face a difficult challenge in attempting to make appropriate judgments. Consider the case of jurors. Jurors' judgments sometimes have been found to be impacted by factors that the law considers irrelevant or inappropriate such as pretrial publicity (e.g., Fein, McCloskey, & Tomlinson, 1997; Otto, Penrod, & Dexter, 1994; Padawer-Singer & Barton, 1975; Simon, 1966), evidence obtained in violation of due process (e.g., Broeder, 1959; Johnson, Whitestone, Jackson, & Gatto, 1995; Kassin & Sommers, 1997; Kassin & Wrightsman, 1981; Kerwin & Shaffer, 1994; Sue, Smith, & Caldwell, 1973; Thompson, Fong, & Rosenhan, 1981; Wolf & Montgomery, 1977), conjectural evidence (e.g., Kassin, Wrightsman, & Saunders, 1990), and characteristics of the defendant such as his or her prior criminal record (e.g., Doob & Kirshenbaum, 1972; Greene & Dodge, 1995; Hans & Doob, 1975; L.S.E. Jury Project, 1973; Pickel, 1995; Wissler & Saks, 1985), race (e.g., Johnson et al., 1995; Ugwuegbu, 1979) or sexual orientation (e.g., Shaffer & Case, 1982). Therefore, if jurors hope to arrive at appropriate legal judgments, attempts to remove the influence of biasing factors are often necessary (see Wegener & Petty, 1997, for a recent review).

An important question addressed by research in juridic decision-making is whether, and when, jurors will obey a judge's instructions to disregard (i.e., correct for the impact of) information deemed inadmissible. Research in the area of bias correction suggests that individuals will attempt to correct their judgments only if they are both motivated and able to do so (Martin, 1986; Martin, Seta, & Crelia, 1990; Ottati & Isbell, 1996; Petty & Wegener, 1993; Srull, 1983; Wegener & Petty, 1997). This research shows that when motivated and able to engage in corrective effort, people correct their judgments in a direction that presumably renders them more accurate. Thus, people correct for the impact of information that is unreliable, mistaken, or proven incorrect, but not for information that is diagnostic for the judgment at hand (Fein et al., 1997; Golding, Fowler, Long, & Latta, 1990; Golding & Hauselt, 1994; Hatvany & Strack, 1980; Kassin & Sommers, 1997; Schul & Manzury, 1990; Wyer & Budesheim, 1987; Wyer & Unverzagt, 1985).

In contrast, several investigations in the juridic decision-making domain suggest that individuals may, under some circumstances, correct for the impact of diagnostic information. Specifically, jurors have been found to correct for evidence that is ruled inadmissible by a judge on procedural grounds (i.e., is procedurally unjust; see Tyler, 1990; Tyler & Smith, 1998) even though its use would lead them to an accurate judgment (in this context, convicting a guilty person or acquitting an innocent person). For example, corrections have been obtained, at least under some circumstances, for diagnostic evidence that was obtained through an illegal wiretap (e.g., Carretta & Moreland, 1983; Sue et al., 1973; Thompson et al., 1981; Wolf & Montgomery, 1977) or through an illegal

search (e.g., Kerwin & Shaffer, 1994). Research has even examined some moderating conditions of correction for procedurally inadmissible evidence. For example, corrections for procedurally inadmissible evidence have been greater for White than Black defendants (Johnson et al., 1995), and following rather than prior to jury deliberation (Kerwin & Shaffer, 1994; see also Carretta & Moreland, 1983). Thus, it appears that jurors sometimes engage in correction for evidence that is procedurally inadmissible even if it is diagnostic of guilt, suggesting that corrections are not always motivated by accuracy concerns.

These studies raise the interesting question of *why* jurors might sometimes correct for the impact of diagnostic, but procedurally inadmissible, evidence. In each case in which nonaccuracy-motivated correction has been demonstrated, the specific motivation behind these corrections has been unclear. This is because corrections were obtained for the impact of evidence obtained in violation of due process only when this evidence was *also* explicitly ruled as legally inadmissible (Carretta & Moreland, 1983; Johnson et al., 1995; Kerwin & Shaffer, 1994; Thompson et al., 1981; Wolf & Montgomery, 1977). Because the evidence was ruled as legally inadmissible, it is not clear if jurors were correcting because of a will to follow the law per se (legal motivation) or out of their personal concerns for procedural justice (procedural justice motivation) or both. Thus, although it is clear that jurors will correct for diagnostic evidence when it is both obtained in violation of due process and is explicitly ruled as legally inadmissible, the question remains as to which nonaccuracy motivation(s) drive these corrections: legal motivation or procedural justice motivation.¹ The present investigation was conducted in order to determine whether and under what conditions corrections of

¹ Kassir and Sommers (1997) have recently concluded that mock jurors will obey judge's instructions to ignore inadmissible evidence when its diagnosticity is questioned but not when the evidence is diagnostic of guilt but is obtained in violation of due process. Thus, they suggest that jurors will ignore inadmissible evidence if doing so will lead to a more accurate judgment, but not because of a will to follow the law per se (legal motivation) or because of concerns about procedural justice (procedural justice motivation). That is, accuracy motivation is assumed to underlie compliance with judge's instructions. However, Kassir and Sommers' (1997) data bearing upon the question of whether jurors are motivated to correct by nonaccuracy concerns are somewhat unclear. Specifically, they exposed participants to no biasing evidence or to pro-conviction evidence (i.e., the defendant's confession of having committed the crime to a friend on the phone) that was ruled as either admissible, inadmissible because it was obtained through an illegal wiretap (inadmissible–due process), or inadmissible because the tape was barely audible (inadmissible–unreliable). They found that the percentage of jurors believing the defendant was guilty in the admissible ($M = 79\%$) and inadmissible–due process ($M = 55\%$) conditions was higher than in the inadmissible–unreliable ($M = 24\%$) or control ($M = 24\%$) conditions. However, they failed to report a statistical comparison between the inadmissible–due process and admissible conditions. Thus, while it is clear that complete correction for the biasing evidence when it was procedurally inadmissible did not occur, it is unclear whether partial correction occurred in this condition, particularly because the means are in the direction of partial correction. Given that several other investigations have demonstrated correction for procedurally inadmissible yet diagnostic evidence, and that Kassir and Sommers' (1997) own data show the same pattern, we believe that previous research supports our conclusion that jurors, under some circumstances, have been motivated by either procedural or legal concerns, or both, rather than accuracy.

juror judgments can be motivated by procedural or legal concerns rather than accuracy.² The goal of this research was to develop a situation in which these two motivations could be teased apart.

We hypothesize that both nonaccuracy motivations for correction exist. That is, jurors may ignore evidence that is diagnostic of guilt for either legal or procedural justice motivations. In addition, we suggest a moderator which determines when each nonaccuracy motive prompts corrections. Specifically, we predict that the severity of the due process, or procedural justice, violation will determine whether correction will be legally or procedurally motivated. When the violation of procedural justice is severe, individuals might correct out of procedural motivation, to follow their personal, internal standard of justice. When the violation of procedural justice is mild, thus not invoking a strong sense of a procedural miscarriage, jurors might correct out of legal motivation (i.e., to follow the judge's instructions and be legally compliant; Kerwin & Shaffer, 1994).

Instigation of Correction: Instructed versus Self-Initiated Corrections

In addition to varying the severity of due process violation, we also varied the instigation of correction. In most studies of bias correction, motivation to correct for perceived bias has been directly invoked by giving participants blatant instructions to remove the impact of certain biasing information (e.g., Golding et al., 1990; Golding & Hauselt, 1994; Petty et al., 1998; Wegener & Petty, 1995; Wegener, Petty, & Dunn, 1998; Wyer & Budesheim, 1987; Wyer & Unverzagt, 1985). Likewise, as noted previously, when correction for bias has been examined in juridic decision-making, jurors are presented with evidence that a judge subsequently rules as inadmissible and "to be disregarded" (e.g., Broeder, 1959; Carretta & Moreland, 1983; Fein et al., 1997; Johnson et al., 1995; Kassin & Sommers, 1997; Kassin & Wrightsman, 1981; L.S.E. Jury Project, 1973; Schul & Manzury, 1990; Sue et al., 1973; Thompson et al., 1981; Wolf & Montgomery, 1977). However, as noted previously, exclusive use of this technique of instigating correction does not allow legal versus procedural motivation (or legal versus any other motivation) to be teased apart.

Particularly strong evidence for a procedurally motivated rather than legally motivated correction could be obtained in a condition not typically considered as leading to correction in jury settings. That is, consider a condition in which jurors

² Surprisingly, little research on correction processes has explicitly examined implications of the notion that individuals sometimes adopt judgment goals other than accuracy. Although a number of perspectives would presumably allow for such effects (e.g., Martin, 1986; Schwarz & Bless, 1992a; Strack, 1992; Wegener & Petty, 1997; Wilson & Brekke, 1994), virtually all of the work in bias correction studies can be understood as corrections aimed at accuracy. Legally motivated corrections can also be viewed as aimed at obtaining accuracy of a sort—accurately following the law (rather than accurately convicting the right person). Procedural justice corrections that undermine both accuracy and following the law would therefore provide particularly compelling evidence for the view that motivations other than accuracy can guide corrections.

receive diagnostic evidence that was obtained in violation of due process, but this evidence is ruled as legally *admissible* by the judge. If jurors correct for or discount such evidence even though they are not told to do so (i.e., they engage in a *spontaneous correction*), this finding would clearly rule out the alternative possibility that jurors are correcting for this evidence simply to follow the law (i.e., to comply with the judge). In such a case (when evidence is ruled admissible by the judge), both legal and accuracy motivations would oppose the correction. Alternatively, evidence for legally motivated correction would be obtained if jurors corrected for the impact of diagnostic evidence only when it is ruled inadmissible by the court, but not when it is ruled as admissible. Thus, a manipulation of the judge's instructions to the jurors regarding whether or not particular evidence is admissible would allow for separate investigation of the two motivations.³

Although this issue has never previously been investigated in a jury context, a few investigations in the more general bias correction literature have found that individuals will sometimes spontaneously correct for perceived biases even though they are not instructed to do so. For example, corrections have occurred when the biasing stimuli themselves were quite blatant (rather than subtle; e.g., Berkowitz & Troccoli, 1990; Martin, 1986) or when situational conditions or characteristics of the perceiver might have been conducive to detection and/or correction of bias (see Lambert, Khan, Lickel, & Fricke, 1997; Ottati & Isbell, 1996; Petty & Wegener, 1993; Srull, 1983; Strack, Martin, & Schwarz, 1988). Thus, it seems quite possible that jurors might also engage in spontaneous correction for bias and that procedural and legal motivations for correction can be teased apart.

Social Roles

Findings by Carretta and Moreland (1983) suggest that (juror) verdicts of guilt in response to procedurally inadmissible yet diagnostic evidence can differ from private judgments of guilt, suggesting that the motivation behind juror verdicts and private judgments of guilt can differ. Specifically, replicating other findings, Carretta and Moreland (1983) found that, for participants' juror verdicts, correction appeared to occur for procedurally inadmissible yet diagnostic evidence. However, for participants' personal assessments of the defendant's probable guilt, correction did not occur for procedurally inadmissible yet diagnostic evidence—participants who received evidence favoring the prosecution believed that the defendant was significantly more guilty than did controls, whereas those who

³ Kadish and Kadish (1971) suggest that jurors are both procedurally and legally motivated. They argue that the decision rule adopted by jurors is to, "Do as the judge tells you unless the consequence is serious injustice" (p. 210). This implies that concerns about procedural injustice can override a general legal motivation. Kadish and Kadish (1971) suggest that this "interposition" of jurors' own interpretation of the law and of their judgment is legitimated by the legal system because the jury has the final say in an acquittal (i.e., an appeal is not possible by law) and because it serves the ultimate goal of the legal system, namely justice.

received evidence favoring the defense believed that the defendant was significantly less guilty than did controls, *even* when the evidence was ruled inadmissible because it was obtained through an illegal wiretap. The authors concluded, "Since verdicts have serious legal consequences for a defendant, whereas personal opinions about his/her guilt or innocence do not, our own subjects may have viewed verdicts as more important decisions requiring greater adherence to the judge's ruling" (p. 306). Alternatively, this could be evidence of jurors adopting different judgment goals for private versus juror judgments (i.e., accuracy for private judgments versus legal, procedural, or both for juror judgments). The possibility that different judgment goals are sometimes adopted for private judgments versus judgments in particular social roles such as that of juror (even for the same judgment) is examined in the current research.

The Flexible Correction Model (FCM; Wegener & Petty, 1997) is a general framework which can be used to understand when and how jurors might attempt to engage in correction. The FCM proposes that corrections can be motivated by different judgment goals (e.g., accuracy, legal, procedural). In addition, it suggests that perceivers' naive theories (perceptions) of bias will guide correction attempts *if* the correction serves their judgment goal. Specifically, individuals correct for the impact of certain information (e.g., inadmissible evidence) by shifting their judgments in a direction *opposite* to their theory of bias (i.e., perceived impact of the information; Petty & Wegener, 1993; Wegener et al., 1998) and to a greater extent the greater the perceived magnitude of bias (Wegener & Petty, 1995). For example, if jurors perceive that evidence biased their judgments toward guilt, then they will correct their judgments toward innocence if correction for the impact of this evidence serves the judgment goal. Thus, measurement of jurors' theories of bias, while a new technique in juridic decision-making, would allow differentiation between whether correction is not occurring because participants are not motivated to correct or because they do not perceive the information as having had an impact (see Wegener & Petty, 1997, for additional discussion).

OVERVIEW OF THE PRESENT RESEARCH

It is clear from prior research that a nonaccuracy goal can motivate correction for bias. Two nonaccuracy goals for correction of procedurally inadmissible evidence have been proposed—obtaining procedural justice and following the law. Prior research showing that people correct for procedural violations when instructed to do so by the judge can be attributed to either motive. To tease these motivations apart, in our research participants were: (a) exposed to incriminating evidence about a defendant and told that it was obtained through either a very serious or a rather mild violation of due process, (b) given instructions by the judge (intended to be nonreactance-inducing; Wolf & Montgomery, 1977) that this evidence was either admissible or inadmissible, and (c) asked to provide both their juror rating and private belief in the defendant's guilt. Participants in an additional control condition received the same basic evidence as in the other conditions but received no information regarding how the incriminating evidence

was obtained and received no ruling of (in)admissibility from the judge. As in previous research on correction for the impact of procedurally inadmissible evidence, the *accuracy* of the incriminating information was never questioned. This was done in order to pit procedural and legal concerns against accuracy motives. Participants were given ample time to complete the materials, they were not distracted during the task, and the biasing (incriminating) information was presented in a nonintegrative manner following the control information, so participants were expected to have the cognitive capacity and ability necessary for corrections to occur.⁴ Thus, differences in correction should reflect differences in motivation to correct.

Consistent with past research, when the violation of due process was mild, we expected that correction would only occur when jurors were explicitly instructed to disregard the information. The serious violation of due process condition allows a test of legal versus procedural justice motives. If only legal motives are operating when violation of procedural justice is serious, people should still only correct their judgments when explicitly instructed to do so. If people are naturally concerned about and correct on the basis of serious procedural justice violations, however, then correction should occur even when jurors are not explicitly instructed to correct.

METHOD

Participants and Design

Fifty-eight undergraduate students at a large Midwestern university were each paid \$10 to participate in the study. Participants were randomly assigned to the cells of a 2 (Severity of due process violation: mild or severe) \times 2 (Judge's instruction: inadmissible or admissible) \times 2 (Type of judgment: juror rating or private belief) mixed design, with the first two factors manipulated between participants and the last factor occurring within-participants. In addition, participants in a control condition received no information relevant to procedural justice and were not instructed to disregard any of the evidence they received.

Procedure

Participants were given a questionnaire booklet which included all manipulations and measures. The first paragraph of the booklet asked participants to assume the role of a jury member in a criminal trial. They were then asked to read a description of evidence presented in a trial in which the defendant was being tried for rape and were told that they would make a decision as to whether he should be found guilty or not guilty of the charge. Following this, everyone completed the experimental booklet, which contained a one-page description of the trial including: (1) a description of the events of the crime; (2) the victim's police report and description of her attacker; (3) information about the defendant's appearance, proximity to the scene of the crime, and alibi; (4) the "biasing" compelling evidence of guilt; (5) the judge's instructions; and (6) the dependent measures.

⁴ Research has suggested that individuals are less able to correct for the impact of biasing information that has been well integrated into knowledge structures than that which has not been well integrated (e.g., Schul & Burnstein, 1985), perhaps because of difficulties in both identifying and correcting for the influence of the bias.

Independent Variables

Control condition. There were three versions of the case materials. In the control condition, participants were provided with the incriminating information that police searched the defendant's apartment and found three pieces of the rape victim's clothing and that the defendant's DNA matched samples found on the victim's body. To ensure that this information would be seen as incriminating, a pretest ($N = 165$) was conducted on a separate group of participants. Participants in the pretest read the case materials to be used in the experiment and responded to the following question on a 9-point scale: Would knowing that the defendant had three pieces of the victim's clothing in his apartment and that his DNA matched samples found on the victim's body make you think the defendant was less guilty than not knowing about this evidence (-4) to more guilty than not knowing about this evidence (+4)? Not surprisingly, a Student t test of the difference between the average rating against zero confirmed that individuals held the naive theory that knowing about the DNA match and victim's clothing evidence would bias them in the direction of judging the defendant to be more guilty than if they had not known about this evidence ($M = 3.67$, $t = 44.39$, $p < .0001$). Thus, according to the FCM, if participants correct for the impact of the evidence regarding the DNA match and victim's clothing in the defendant's apartment, they should adjust their judgments toward innocence.

Severity of due process violation. To vary the severity of the due process violation, participants in the experimental conditions read the control information but also learned how the incriminating information was obtained. Those in the *serious violation* of due process condition learned: (1) that the victim's clothing was obtained when police broke into all residences within a 2-mile radius of the scene of the crime in the middle of the night without obtaining search warrants and (2) that the defendant's DNA sample had been seized without the defendant's permission from the local Red Cross where the defendant had donated blood. This condition provided a test of whether procedurally motivated correction can overwhelm legal and accuracy motivations when the affront to procedural justice is highly salient. Those in the *mild violation* of due process condition learned: (1) that the victim's clothing was obtained 5 min after the search warrant expired because the defendant was armed in the apartment and the police were forced to wait for backup and (2) that the defendant initially gave permission to have his DNA tested but withdrew permission after the incriminating results were known.

An additional pretest ($N = 26$) with a separate sample of participants was conducted to empirically ascertain whether individuals perceived the biasing evidence as less appropriate and more unfair to use in juror judgments when it was obtained through serious versus mild violation of due process. Individuals responded to four questions, two for each type of evidence collection regarding: (1) how appropriate and (2) how unfair it would be to consider the DNA match and victim's clothing as a juror in a rape case given how this evidence was obtained, each on an 11-point scale ranging from "not at all" (1) to "very much" (11). A repeated-measures ANOVA revealed that pretest participants believed that it was less appropriate and more unfair to consider the DNA match and victim's clothing as a juror in judging guilt or innocence in a rape case when they were obtained through serious violation of due process ($M_{\text{appropriate}} = 6.15$, $M_{\text{unfair}} = 6.04$) than through mild violation of due process ($M_{\text{appropriate}} = 8.54$, $M_{\text{unfair}} = 4.00$), $F(1, 25) = 14.78$, $p < .01$, $F(1, 25) = 8.80$, $p < .01$, respectively.

Judge's instruction. Following the case materials, all participants were given instructions by the judge. Participants in the control condition were told by the judge, "You should make your decision based on the information presented in this trial." Participants in the experimental conditions learned that the defense attorney objected to the presentation of the biasing information (victim's clothing and DNA sample), claiming that both pieces of evidence were illegally obtained. Participants in the *admissible instruction* condition read that the judge ruled both pieces of evidence admissible for this particular case, and they received the control condition instructions to consider all information presented in the trial. Participants in the *inadmissible instruction* condition read that the judge ruled both pieces of evidence as not admissible, and they were told by the judge, "You should ignore the evidence that was obtained illegally in making your decision in this case, because the court holds that illegal evidence is irrelevant in judging guilt or innocence in this particular case."

Type of judgment. After reading the case materials, participants indicated how they would vote if they were a juror in the case on a 9-point scale ranging from “absolutely guilty” (−4) to “absolutely innocent” (+4). After providing their juror rating, participants indicated how they personally felt about the guilt or innocence of the defendant as an observer rather than as a jury member. This judgment was made on the same 9-point scale ranging from “absolutely guilty” (−4) to “absolutely innocent” (+4).

Manipulation Checks

To check on the manipulation of the severity of due process violation, participants were asked two recognition questions following their completion of juror and private guilt ratings. One question asked about the collection of the victim’s clothing evidence, and one asked about the DNA evidence. Participants were asked:

What information did you receive regarding how *the evidence that three pieces of the victim’s clothing were in the defendant’s apartment (or the DNA evidence)* was obtained?

- a. It was obtained when police broke into all residences within a 2-mile radius of the scene of the crime in the middle of the night without obtaining a warrant (It was obtained without the defendant’s permission, by seizing his blood donation from the Red Cross).
- b. It was obtained 5 minutes after the search warrant expired, because the defendant was armed in the apartment, and the police were forced to wait for backup (It was obtained with the defendant’s permission, but after his blood was drawn and the results were back, he withdrew permission).
- c. You were told nothing about how this evidence was obtained.
- d. Neither A, B, nor C.

To check on the judge’s instruction manipulation, participants were asked, “In this trial, which of the following were you told by the judge? a. You should *not* consider illegally obtained evidence (i.e., his possession of the victim’s clothing, DNA match) regarding the defendant in judging his innocence or guilt; b. You should make your decision based on all the information presented in this trial.” Correct responses to each question were coded as “1” and incorrect responses as “0.”

RESULTS

Manipulation Checks

Manipulation check measures were subjected to 2 (Severity of due process violation) \times 2 (Judge’s instruction) \times 2 (Type of judgment) log-linear analyses. As expected, no significant effects emerged, suggesting that manipulations were equally effective across conditions. Ninety-three percent of participants correctly recalled the manner in which the victim’s clothes were found in the defendant’s apartment, 97% correctly recalled the manner in which the defendant’s DNA sample was obtained, and 90% correctly recalled the judge’s instructions they were given. Thus, participants were highly accurate in identifying the evidence collection methods and the judge’s instructions.⁵

⁵ The same results are obtained on the guilt judgments when only those participants who were correct in identifying the two methods of evidence collection and judge’s instructions are included in the analyses.

TABLE 1
PRIVATE BELIEFS AND JUROR RATINGS OF GUILT AS A FUNCTION OF EVIDENCE
COLLECTION METHOD AND JUDGE'S INSTRUCTIONS

Evidence collection method	Admissible		Inadmissible	
	Private beliefs	Juror ratings	Private beliefs	Juror ratings
Mild violation of due process	3.18 (11)	3.27 (11)	3.58 (12)	.25 (12)
Serious violation of due process	3.58 (12)	1.42 (12)	3.08 (12)	1.67 (12)
Control (bias only)	3.64 (11)	3.45 (11)		

Note. *N*'s indicated in parentheses.

Guilt Judgments

Responses to both private and juror guilt judgments were reverse-scored so that more positive numbers indicated greater perceptions of guilt. All means are presented in Table 1. Participants in the control condition believed that the defendant was rather guilty, and this belief was equivalent for both private ($M = 3.64$) and juror ($M = 3.45$) judgments, $t = .48$, $p = .51$, ns. Furthermore, neither severe nor mild procedural violations of due process undermined or enhanced private beliefs in guilt when this evidence was explicitly ruled as admissible by the judge. A three-group ANOVA on private judgments in the admissible (no-correction) conditions revealed no differences between groups, $F(2, 31) = .68$, $p = .51$. That is, participants privately believed the defendant was equally guilty when due process had been seriously ($M = 3.58$) versus mildly ($M = 3.18$) violated, and neither condition differed from the control case. Thus, any differences in judgments of guilt between serious and mild violation of due process conditions in the remaining conditions can be seen as an indication of differences in motivation to correct, rather than differences in the initial impact of the biasing information.

A 2 (Severity of due process violation) \times 2 (Judge's instruction) \times 2 (Type of judgment) mixed-design ANOVA was conducted for the 47 participants who were in the experimental conditions. The main effects of Type of judgment, $F(1, 43) = 29.07$, $p < .01$ ($M_{\text{private belief}} = 3.36$, $M_{\text{juror rating}} = 1.62$), and Judge's instruction, $F(1, 43) = 3.22$, $p < .08$ ($M_{\text{admissible}} = 2.85$, $M_{\text{inadmissible}} = 2.15$), indicated that people had higher beliefs in guilt in their private than in their juror judgments and rated the defendant as less guilty when the judge ruled the biasing information as inadmissible. These main effects were qualified by a significant interaction of Judge's instruction \times Type of judgment, $F(1, 43) = 4.46$, $p < .04$, which suggested that participants corrected their juror ratings when the evidence was ruled as inadmissible (i.e., when they were explicitly instructed to correct their judgments), $F(1, 45) = 3.90$, $p < .06$, ($M_{\text{admissible}} = 2.30$, $M_{\text{inadmissible}} = .96$), but did not correct their private beliefs when the evidence was ruled as inadmissible, $F(1, 45) = .03$, $p = .85$, ($M_{\text{admissible}} = 3.39$, $M_{\text{inadmissible}} = 3.33$).

More importantly, these effects were further qualified by a significant three-way interaction of Severity of due process violation \times Judge's instruction \times Type of judgment, $F(1, 43) = 10.87, p < .01$ (means in Table 1). This interaction was examined by separately analyzing the Judge's instruction \times Type of judgment interaction for those in the mild and serious violation of due process conditions. For those in the mild violation of due process condition, the main effects of Type of judgment, $F(1, 21) = 30.48, p < .01$ ($M_{\text{private belief}} = 3.39, M_{\text{juror rating}} = 1.70$), and Judge's instruction, $F(1, 21) = 8.25, p < .01$ ($M_{\text{admissible}} = 3.23, M_{\text{inadmissible}} = 1.92$), were qualified by a significant Judge's instruction \times Type of judgment interaction, $F(1, 21) = 33.99, p < .01$. As expected, people corrected for the violation of due process only when they were explicitly instructed to do so. That is, people's juror ratings were less indicative of guilt than their private judgments when the evidence was ruled as inadmissible (i.e., were corrected toward innocence), $F(1, 11) = 42.31, p < .01$ ($M_{\text{private belief}} = 3.58, M_{\text{juror rating}} = .25$), but corrections did not occur when the judge ruled the information as admissible, $F(1, 10) = .13, p = .72$ ($M_{\text{private belief}} = 3.18, M_{\text{juror rating}} = 3.27$). Or, stated differently, people corrected their ratings as jurors when told to ignore the incriminating evidence but did not correct their private beliefs. This pattern is consistent with that obtained in prior research and could have stemmed solely from a legal motivation (i.e., following the judge's precise instruction to correct or not regardless of one's personal beliefs) or from a combination of legal and procedural motives (i.e., correcting when told to because of the judge's instruction and not correcting when the information was ruled admissible because of personal beliefs that the procedural error was not severe enough to warrant correction if not required by law). The serious violation case provides the critical test of whether procedural justice motives can outweigh legal ones. For these conditions, only a main effect of Type of judgment was found, $F(1, 22) = 10.55, p < .01$. This indicated that participants corrected toward innocence from their private beliefs ($M = 3.33$) to their juror ratings ($M = 1.54$) whether or not they were explicitly instructed to correct. That is, when evidence obtained in serious violation of due process was provided, people corrected their juror ratings not only when instructed to do so, but also when the biasing information was explicitly ruled as admissible. This *spontaneous correction* in the latter case actually goes against both the diagnosticity of the information for guilt (accuracy motivation) and following the law (legal motivation) and suggests that people can be motivated to correct their juror judgments based on procedural justice concerns, at least when the procedural justice violation is severe.⁶

⁶ Examining juror ratings and private beliefs separately (for each Severity of due process violation \times Judge's instruction interaction) revealed conceptually the same findings. Specifically, on the juror rating, a main effect of Judge's instruction, $F(1, 43) = 4.53, p < .04$ ($M_{\text{admissible}} = 1.95, M_{\text{inadmissible}} = .45$), was qualified by a Severity of due process violation \times Judge's instruction interaction, $F(1, 43) = 6.31, p < .02$. That is, people who received evidence obtained in mild violation of due process corrected their juror ratings when instructed ($M_{\text{admissible}} = 3.27, M_{\text{inadmissible}} = .25$), $F(1, 21) = 20.23, p < .01$. Because of the spontaneous correction of juror ratings by people who received

DISCUSSION

This research provides four advances in our understanding of when and why individuals, and specifically jurors, engage in correction for bias. First, these findings provide the first evidence that a procedural justice motivation per se can motivate bias correction. Correction was found for procedurally *admissible* evidence in the case of severe violations of due process. This finding suggests that procedural concerns can override both accuracy concerns and concerns about following the law. That is, because the evidence was explicitly ruled as admissible by the judge, correction constituted *disobeying* the judge's instruction. Procedural concerns also appeared to override accuracy concerns because perceivers, according to their private judgments, believed that the evidence was indicative of guilt. Thus, in contrast to recent conclusions regarding the inability of procedural concerns to motivate corrections (see Kassin & Sommers, 1997, and footnote 1), we found, for the first time, that procedure-based corrections can even overwhelm alternative judgment goals such as accuracy and lawfulness. In addition, this finding provided the first evidence of spontaneous (i.e., uninstructed) correction for biasing evidence in a jury context.

Second, these findings provide evidence that a legal motivation per se can

evidence obtained through serious violation of due process ($M = 1.42$), however, the judge's inadmissible ruling did not have any further effect on juror ratings ($M = 1.67$), $F(1, 22) = .05$, $p = .82$. Private beliefs were the same regardless of the severity of due process violation or ruling of admissibility (all p 's $> .15$). Finally, examining admissible and inadmissible conditions separately (for each Severity of due process violation \times Type of judgment interaction) revealed conceptually the same findings for admissible conditions but one interesting and unexpected finding for inadmissible conditions. Specifically, for the admissible conditions, a marginal effect of Type of judgment, $F(1, 21) = 4.04$, $p < .06$ ($M_{\text{private beliefs}} = 3.39$, $M_{\text{juror ratings}} = 2.30$), was qualified by a Severity of due process violation \times Type of judgment interaction, $F(1, 21) = 4.78$, $p < .05$. People who received evidence obtained in serious violation of due process spontaneously corrected their juror ratings ($M = 1.42$) from their private beliefs ($M = 3.58$), $F(1, 11) = 5.09$, $p < .05$, but those who received evidence obtained in mild violation of due process did not ($M_{\text{private beliefs}} = 3.18$, $M_{\text{juror ratings}} = 3.27$), $F(1, 10) = .13$, $p < .72$. For the inadmissible conditions, the expected main effect of Type of judgment ($M_{\text{private beliefs}} = 3.33$, $M_{\text{juror ratings}} = .96$), $F(1, 22) = 40.47$, $p < .01$, was qualified by an unexpected Severity of due process violation \times Role of judgment interaction, $F(1, 22) = 6.59$, $p < .02$. This interaction suggested that people who received evidence obtained in mild violation of due process corrected their judgments more when instructed by the judge ($M_{\text{private beliefs}} = 3.58$, $M_{\text{juror ratings}} = .25$) than those who received evidence obtained in serious violation of due process ($M_{\text{private beliefs}} = 3.08$, $M_{\text{juror ratings}} = 1.67$). It is possible that those in the serious violation of due process conditions continued to correct according to an internal standard even when instructed by the judge, whereas those in the mild violation of due process condition corrected instead according to an external, and presumably different, standard (i.e., the judge's) about which they had to guess. This interpretation is supported by the finding that those in the serious violation of due process conditions corrected to the same extent spontaneously as with the judge's prompting (Judge's instructions \times Type of judgment interaction, $F(1, 22) = .46$, $p = .50$, ns). This explanation would support the possibility that jurors are following the judge's instructions when violation of due process is mild because they want to comply with what they perceive to be the judge's standard (or a legal standard), rather than because the judge's instructions remind them of their own personal sense of justice. However, future research should further explore this possibility.

motivate bias correction. Correction was found for inadmissible but not admissible evidence when violation of due process was mild. This finding suggests that a legal motivation is capable of overwhelming the accuracy concerns of jurors when procedural concerns are mild or nonobvious.

To summarize thus far, it appears that jurors are motivated by both procedural and legal concerns in making their juror ratings, as suggested by Kadish and Kadish (1971). In this vein, this investigation provides a third advance in our understanding of nonaccuracy motivations for correction. Specifically, it uncovered a moderator that determines when each nonaccuracy goal guides corrections: severity of due process violation. Legal concerns provided the most parsimonious account of juror judgments when the violation of procedural justice was mild, but concerns about procedural justice were more important than both accuracy and legal motives when the procedural justice violation was severe.

Fourth, these findings are consistent with the notion that different judgment goals are adopted in different social roles, even for the same judgment. Specifically, it appears that the primary motivation adopted when individuals were forming their private (rather than their juror) judgments was neither legal nor procedural. Replicating Carretta and Moreland (1983), correction for the impact of biasing (but diagnostic) information on private beliefs *never* occurred, even when use of this information was against the law (i.e., inadmissible) or would undermine procedural justice. Thus, when instructed to ignore evidence that clearly established the defendant's guilt, individuals did not correct their private beliefs. These results support the view that individuals adopted the goal of accuracy in forming their private beliefs, and were not motivated by either procedural or legal concerns in these judgments.

In sum, this research provides an advance in our understanding of *why* individuals might be motivated to correct for bias in social judgments. Whereas most previous work on motivation behind bias correction attempts has investigated accuracy motives, the present work clearly shows that concerns for procedural legitimacy or for following the law per se can drive corrections (even if those corrections might conflict with accuracy). Consistent with the FCM (Wegener & Petty, 1997), changes in judgment goals modified the correction attempts.

Implications for Juridic Decision-Making

This research provides several advances specific to the area of juridic decision-making. First, this framework helps tease apart the explanations for correction of procedurally unjust evidence. It appears that such corrections can be due to either legal or procedural motivations, depending on the severity of the violation of due process. Thus, the investigation by Kerwin and Shaffer (1994) can be seen as an instance of a relatively nonobvious procedural violation leading to legally rather than procedurally motivated correction (recall that spontaneous correction in our admissible condition did *not* occur when the violation of due process was mild). Second and more broadly, this work suggests one condition under which jurors

might obey a judge's instructions to ignore inadmissible evidence (for the sake of following the instructions *per se*): when serious procedural justice concerns are not aroused.

A third advance provided in this area is that the procedurally motivated spontaneous correction dispels earlier assumptions that laypersons' conceptions of justice, unlike that of the legal system, are outcome- (i.e., distributive) as opposed to process-oriented (e.g., Packer, 1964). In this way, this finding is consistent with the work of Tyler (1990; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992; Tyler & Smith, 1998) suggesting that laypersons are also concerned with obtaining procedural justice. They base judgments of the legitimacy of legal, governmental, and organizational institutions and authorities on the basis of their perceptions of the level of procedural justice therein, and these judgments have implications for their behavior with respect to the institution (e.g., greater perceived procedural justice leading to greater obedience with laws; Tyler, 1990).

Finally, this work reveals a new jury nullification phenomenon that has not been considered previously in the area of jurisprudence—that individuals might sometimes disobey judges' instructions to use admissible evidence thereby acquitting a defendant (if the jurors perceive that the evidence was obtained in serious violation of due process). Whereas much research has focused on understanding why jurors do and do not obey judge's instructions to ignore inadmissible evidence, no investigations to our knowledge have investigated the possibility of a potentially equally serious problem (from the vantage point of the legal system) of jurors ignoring instructions to *use* certain evidence in making judgments of guilt.

Future Research

The current study furthers our understanding of situational determinants (i.e., social role) of judgment goals and outlines their implications for judgments. It dovetails with theory and research suggesting the existence of individual differences in the chronic or "default" judgment goals adopted by individuals, and their implications for judgments. For example, Kohlberg's (1976) theory of moral development suggests that some individuals might be likely to have legal concerns as their default judgment goal (i.e., individuals who are at Stage 4 of moral development, Law-and-Order Morality: following the laws of the larger society except in extreme cases where they conflict with other social duties), whereas others might have procedural concerns as their default judgment goal (i.e., individuals at Stage 5 of moral development, Human-Rights and Social-Welfare Morality: obtaining justice within the law by changing or deliberately flouting laws which fail to uphold ethical principles and human rights). In addition, evidence supports the idea that individual differences related to the goal of procedural justice affect judgments made in a jury context. Specifically, Casper and Benedict (1993) found that individuals' attitudes towards due process (e.g., self-reported beliefs about police rights to incarcerate a suspect without trial, the discretion police ought to have when questioning suspects) significantly predicted

judgments of the level of damages to be awarded a plaintiff who was subjected to an illegal search and seizure, such that award increased as belief in due process increased. It seems plausible to suggest that individual differences in chronic motivation might moderate the present findings. Future work should continue to investigate both situational and individual difference determinants of judgment goals (accuracy, procedural justice, legal, and others) and their impact on subsequent information scrutiny and use or correction.

Although in the current research, accuracy motivation prevailed in guiding private judgments, this need not always be the case. Although accuracy is likely to be a prevalent goal in private social judgment (Brewer, 1988; Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), it is plausible that people can also be motivated by nonaccuracy concerns in their private judgments and decision making, such as protecting their self-esteem or being (procedurally or distributively) fair to others (cf. Chaiken, Wood, & Eagly, 1996; Petty & Wegener, 1998). Recent findings by Lambert et al. (1997) suggest that individuals might be more motivated to avoid forming negatively than positively biased private impressions of members of stereotyped groups, perhaps because of perceptions of historical procedural injustice toward members of stereotyped groups. Specifically, they found correction for the impact of negative but not positive stereotypes, even though the stereotypes were similarly diagnostic for the judgments at hand (see Lambert et al., 1997; Petty, Wegener, & White, 1998; Wyer & Budesheim, 1987; Wyer & Unverzagt, 1985, for conceptually similar results). A promising direction for future work is to investigate whether and under what conditions individuals might choose to hold inaccurate *private* judgments in an attempt to be fair.

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